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Abstract: 
Large proportions of the electorate can best be described as politically ignorant.  If 
casting a competent vote requires some basic knowledge of the incumbent’s identity, the 
workings of the political system, one’s own policy preferences and the policy preferences 
of the main candidates, many voters cannot vote competently.  Wittman (1989) suggests 
that, if ignorance is unbiased, overall results will be determined by informed voters as the 
ignorant cancel each other out.  Lupia and McCubbins (1998) provides a mechanism 
whereby voters with little information can take cues from more informed colleagues in 
order to vote as if they had the requisite information.  Using data from a uniquely useful 
dataset, the 2005 New Zealand Election Survey, I show that both mechanisms fail.  
Political ignorance is not unbiased: rather, it strongly predicts policy and political party 
preferences after correcting for the demographic correlates of ignorance.  Moreover, 
membership in the kinds of organizations held to allow the ignorant to overcome their 
deficiencies fails to improve outcomes.  Voter ignorance remains a very serious problem. 
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I. Introduction 
H.L. Mencken defined democracy as a pitiful belief in the collective wisdom of 
individual ignorance.  While Mencken predated modern public choice literature by 
several decades, he did anticipate one of its major theoretical arguments: whether 
democracy can work well despite voter ignorance.  We have convincing evidence of 
widespread voter ignorance (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  Somin (1998) also surveys 
the literature.  In addition to the standard findings that few voters can name their 
representatives, that only a bare majority knows which party controls Congress, and that 
about a third are complete “know-nothings”, even more shocking results include that only 
38% of Americans in 1964 knew that the Soviet Union was not a NATO member.  At the 
height of the Cold War, only two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, most Americans 
weren’t aware that the Soviets were not a part of the organization founded to protect 
Europe and the West against the Soviets.  Pervasive ignorance has characterized the 
electorate for rather some time. 
We all know that such ignorance is rational: Anthony Downs demonstrated the logic of 
rational ignorance half a century ago.  Traditional public choice theory has then argued 
that voter ignorance provides room for agency problems between voters and 
representatives.2  More recent work has argued that democracy is robust even to high 
levels of voter ignorance.  The law of large numbers provides a strong defense against 
ignorance so long as ignorance is unbiased.  As Wittman (1989) shows, in a binary 
contest where a large proportion of the electorate effectively is flipping coins to make its 
decision, it’s the informed voters that determine the outcome.  Of course, that result 
depends critically on that ignorance imparts no bias to choice. 
Further work by Lupia and McCubbins (1998) shows that voters can behave as though 
they have complete knowledge through the use of shortcuts.  So, for example, if you’re a 
political know-nothing but you’re a member of a gun club, somebody there will tell you 
to vote for the Republicans if you care a lot about firearms ownership and curtailment of 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Grossman and Helpman’s 1996 model in which lobbyists have influence only because 
of uninformed voters. 
Second Amendment rights.  On the other side, if you’re a political know-nothing but 
you’re a member of a union, somebody there will tell you to vote for the Democrat if you 
care about maintaining or enhancing union bargaining power to keep your wages up.  
Wittman (1989, 1995) argues that simply having a more politically knowledgeable friend 
with similar tastes may suffice for informed choice.  Lupia (1994) shows that otherwise 
uninformed voters who knew only Ralph Nader’s position on a complicated California 
insurance referendum voted similarly to informed voters of similar demographic 
characteristics.  Lupia and McCubbins (1998) provide a model in which uninformed 
voters can choose competently when directed by a third party that either is trusted and 
knowledgeable or is subject to penalties for lying.  Membership in organizations such as 
unions, professional associations, environmental groups, and churches all then can 
provide the otherwise-uninformed voter with useful cues and cue-givers to aid in voting 
decisions: group membership should attenuate the effect of ignorance. 
The New Zealand Election Survey provides very useful data here.  In addition to a wide 
variety of demographic information and data on policy and party preferences, the survey 
provides both factual questions about the New Zealand voting system that can benchmark 
political ignorance and details on membership in associations that we might expect to 
attenuate the effects of ignorance on party and policy choices.  I know of no other dataset 
that combines detailed demographic data with policy and party preferences, measures of 
political ignorance, and membership in relevant social groups.  Section II describes the 
dataset and constructs the ignorance measures.  Section III provides our hypotheses, 
describes our econometric approach to testing, and discusses the results. 
II. The New Zealand Election Survey 
The New Zealand Election Study began surveys of the New Zealand electorate in 1990.  
The 2005 survey provides data on about 3700 potential voters.  The survey is broadly 
representative of the New Zealand population, but with oversampling of Maori  
Table 1: Summary statistics on NZES respondents and the NZ population3 
 NZES NZ Population 
% Male 44.5 % 48% 
Age 52 45 
New Zealand born 85% 77% 
European ethnicity 70% 79% 
Maori ethnicity 32% 15% 
Pacific ethnicity 2.3% 6.9% 
Asian ethnicity 2.5% 9.2% 
Personal income $34,300 $30,500 
Household income $62,100 $65,500 
Union membership 17.4% 17.3% 
Voting intentions  (among voters): 
     Labour 43% 41% 
     National 30% 39% 
     Green 5.5% 5.3% 
     NZ First 6.7% 5.7% 
     ACT 1.5% 1.5% 
     United Future 2.7% 2.7% 
     Maori Party 8.9% 2% 
     Progressive 1% 1.2% 
     Other 0.9% 1.5% 
     Didn’t vote 4.8% 19.1% 
electorates.4  Table 1, above, provides summary statistics on survey respondents and the 
New Zealand population. 
II.1 Ignorance measures 
The NZES provides five broad mechanisms for assessing a respondent’s level of political 
ignorance.  Respondents are asked to place parties on a left-right index, to answer 
questions about the operation of the electoral system, and to identify one’s Member of 
Parliament, his party, and the composition of the previous government.   
                                                 
3 Gender, age and ethnicity data taken from the 2006 New Zealand Census and include only respondents 
over age 20; as the NZES excludes respondents under age 18, including minors in population data would 
provide a skewed picture of NZES representativeness.  Respondents to both surveys can indicate multiple 
ethnicities, so the sum of all ethnicities can exceed 100%.  Census respondents indicating “New Zealander” 
were added to those indicating European ethnicity.  Income data from the 2005 June quarter Household 
Income Survey.  Population data on voting comes from realized outcomes in the 2005 general election. 
4 I include Maori ethnicity as a control variable in later specifications. The oversampling will not induce 
bias in my results. 
As New Zealand operates under a Mixed Member Proportional electoral system, there are 
many political parties from which to choose.  I consequently only scored respondents 
based on their ability to place National, United Future, and Labour successfully on a left-
right index.  National in 2005 was a clearly conservative party, United Future a 
classically centrist or centre-right party, and Labour a traditional labour party.  
Respondents then could score a maximum of three on the ideology ignorance variable: 
inability to place National relative to Labour, National relative to United Future, and 
United Future relative to Labour each add one to the respondent’s constructed ideology 
ignorance score.  Scores ranged from 0 to 3.  60% of the sample could correctly place 
National, United Future, and Labour in correct order. 
I then constructed a measure of the respondent’s ignorance about the operation of the 
MMP electoral system.  Here respondents’ scores increased with incorrect answers to 
factual questions about the operation of the system and with inconsistent answers about 
respondent preferences.  On factual questions, respondents scored a +1 to their MMP 
ignorance measure for: indicating that the electorate vote is more important in 
determining the composition of Parliament than the party list vote; being unable correctly 
to identify the conditions for a party’s entry into Parliament as being either winning 5% 
of the vote or winning at least one electorate; and, for indicating the party with the most 
votes is more likely to win the most seats under First Past the Post than under MMP.  On 
the consistency questions, respondents scored a +1 for indicating that they preferred that 
there be lots of parties but that they also preferred FPTP to MMP, for indicating that they 
preferred that there only be two big parties but that they also preferred MMP to FPTP, for 
indicating that the current number of parties (8) was “about right” but still preferring 
FPTP to MMP, and for indicating a preference for single-party government combined 
with a preference for MMP over FPTP (or vice-versa).  Scores on this measure ranged 
from 0 to 6.  A little over half of respondents knew each of that the party vote is the most 
important, that winning either 5% of the party vote or an electorate is sufficient, and that 
the party with the most votes is more likely to get the most seats under MMP. 
The survey also provides three quiz questions: incorrectly identifying the term of 
Parliament as being 4 years, failing to recognize that enrolling to vote is compulsory, and 
not knowing that permanent residents are allowed the vote each scored the respondent a 
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+1 on his quiz ignorance measure; scores ranged again from zero to 3.  83% of 
respondents correctly identified the term of Parliament, but only 28% knew that some 
non-citizens have the right to vote. 
Respondents were asked to identify the parties that formed the government after the 2002 
election.  In some cases, membership was ambiguous: the Green Party was not a part of 
the governing coalition but abstained on matters of confidence.  Respondents earned a +1 
to their government ignorance measure by indicating either an inability to recall any of 
the parties in government, failing to indicate each of Labour and the Progressive Party to 
be part of the coalition, or by incorrectly identifying National, New Zealand First, Act, or 
the Maori Party as being part of the government.  Scores here ranged from 0 to 5.  While 
83% of respondents knew that Labour was part of the government, only 39% identified 
the Labour-Progressive coalition.  84 respondents identified National, the main 
opposition party, as being part of the government. 
Finally, respondents were scored on their ability successfully to identify the name and 
party affiliation of their Member of Parliament.  Incorrectly identifying the party 
affiliation of a respondent-named List-MP also scored a +1.  MP ignorance scores ranged 
from 0 to 3.  56% of respondents could name their Member of Parliament and that MP’s 
party. 
Figure 1: Respondent scores on each of the ignorance measures. 
I aggregated respondent scores by taking a simple sum across all measures, by summing 
the Z-scores of respondent deviations from average scores across all measures, and by 
taking the principal component factor across the five measures.  Individual scores by each 
aggregation mechanism correlated very strongly (>0.99 in all cases); I retained the 
principal component factor as my measure of ignorance for ease of interpretation: by 
construction, the principal component is of mean zero and standard deviation 1.  As 
expected, robustness checks using the different measures did not reveal any sensitivity to 
the chosen aggregation mechanism.  The factor analysis is available in the appendix as 
Appendix Table 1.  Just as all reasonable measures of intelligence load on a single factor, 
so too for reasonable measures of ignorance. 
Prior and Lupia (2008) criticize the use of this type of political knowledge measure.  
Survey respondents have little incentive to perform well on these “pop quizzes”; by 
contrast, in the lead-up to an election, citizens presumably put great time and effort into 
thoughtful consideration of for whom to vote.  Prior and Lupia consequently argue that 
demonstrations of voter incompetence in answering survey questions reveal little about 
actual voter competence at the ballot box.  Survey questions about the workings of the 
political system require respondents to access what Prior and Lupia call “declarative 
memory”; they show that appropriate incentives can induce better respondent 
performance on such questions.  I here make use of a survey that simultaneously asks 
respondents questions addressing competence and questions addressing party and policy 
preferences: while competence questions may hinge on declarative memory, Prior and 
Lupia do not suggest similarly for party and policy preferences.  We can think of the 
difference as being analogous to asking a respondent what their home sports team’s away 
average was in 1968 and asking for whom the respondent cheers: the latter question does 
not key to declarative memory.  If Prior and Lupia’s contention is correct, my measure of 
voter ignorance should have little predictive power in explaining party and policy 
preference.  If it does have predictive power, then measures of voter ignorance are very 
useful regardless of whether respondents can improve on such scales through use of 
appropriate incentives. 
II.2: Economic knowledge 
I next aggregated responses to questions relating to economic policy.  The NZES solicits 
many policy preferences, a subset of which address matters with which most economists 
would agree: broadly constituted, I call these “economic thinking”.  While the questions 
provide a mix of positive and normative statements, surveys of economists suggest 
economists’ responses to these questions would be broadly unidirectional.5  Regardless of 
their equity preferences, few economists would disagree that high income taxes make 
people less willing to work hard, though we might disagree about the magnitude of the 
elasticity; 26% of survey respondents disagreed with the statement and a further 5% 
disagreed strongly.  Similarly very few economists would support the controlling of 
wages or prices by law as a solution to New Zealand’s economic problems; 21% of 
survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with wage controls and 35% agreed with 
price controls.  The following policy variables were included in constructing an economic 
policy index: 
• There should be a law to further reduce pay differences between women and men6 
• High income tax makes people less willing to work hard7 
• The government should control wages by law 
• The government should control prices by law8 
• The government should introduce import controls9 
                                                 
5 Contrast statements here with the economic policy preferences later examined.  While it’s reasonable to 
believe most economists oppose wage and price controls, preferences over taxation and redistribution, for 
example, are far less obviously unidirectional; the latter consequently is one of the preferences I seek to 
explain. 
6 83% of labour economists disagree with legislation mandating equal pay for equal work, with 89% of 
labour economists believing such legislation would not increase labour market efficiency and 56% 
believing that such measures would not increase labour market equity (Whaples, 1996). 
7 91% of labour economists agree that leisure is a normal good for most workers.  However, most labour 
economists also agree that most adult men are on the vertical section of their labour supply curve while 
most adult women are not (Whaples, 1996); taken as a whole, this suggests a reasonable labour elasticity to 
taxes.  R. M. Alston et al., 1992, find only 55% of economists agree or strongly agree that lower marginal 
income taxes reduce leisure and increase work effort, but the question here asks about “high” tax rates; I’m 
here assuming that few economists would disagree that a return to the kinds of top marginal tax rates seen 
in the 1970s would have a substantial effect. 
8 74% of economists disagree that wage and price controls are useful in controlling inflation (Alston, Kearl 
and Vaughn, 1992).   
9 92% of economists agreed or partially agreed that tariffs and import quotas generally reduce welfare 
(Fuller and Geide-Stevenson, 2003). 
• Immigration is good for the New Zealand economy10 
• Minimum wages reduce the creation of new jobs11 
• The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one12 
I constructed two different aggregate measures of “economic thinking”.  The first added 
up the number of instances of responses that agree with economists and subtracts the 
number of instances of disagreement, leaving neutral responses and “don’t know” as 
neutral.  The second scored each measure from -2 to +2 depending on the strength of 
agreement or disagreement, then used a principal-component factor analysis of the eight 
items to generate a single economics index of mean zero and standard deviation 1.  The 
two measures correlate at 0.77.  The second was retained for ease of interpretation, 
though no major results change in using the first measure.  The principal-component 
analysis is included as Appendix Table 4.13 
III. Causes and consequences of ignorance 
The New Zealand Election Survey provides a wide variety of demographic variables that 
might be predicted to correlate with political ignorance.  We would expect that 
respondents indicating an interest in politics and seeking out political news will be less 
ignorant than others.  Similarly, those with more education should be expected to be less 
ignorant.  Consistent with previous literature, we expect males to have more political 
knowledge than females and that ethnicity, income and age may matter.  Members of 
interest groups and churches may be less ignorant as they may be more likely to learn 
                                                 
10 96% of labour economists agree that “the overall gains to American society from immigration exceed the 
losses.” (Whaples, 1996) 
11 87% of labour economists agree that minimum wages increase unemployment among the young and 
unskilled (Whaples, 1996). 
12 None of the surveys of economists I have found have asked this question directly; however, most surveys 
show broad support for shifts towards negative income taxes or expansion of EITC as being the most 
effective ways of helping the poor. 
13 The principal component analysis revealed that the questions loaded onto two factors.  As a robustness 
check, I dropped the two questions that loaded primarily onto the second factor (whether high income taxes 
affect labour supply and whether immigration helps the economy), leaving a measure that loaded onto a 
single factor, and checked results against the alternative “economic thinking” index.  The two measures 
correlate at 0.98 and results did not change with the alternative specification of “economic thinking”.  
things about the political system from colleagues.  Having internet access decreases the 
cost of acquiring political information and so should correlate negatively with ignorance. 
Of course, a host of other available variables might well affect ignorance.  I consequently 
employed a general-to-specific reduction of an OLS specification to determine the 
variables affecting political ignorance: εα +++= ωGβXIgnorance  where the X vector 
denotes variables suggested by theory and the G vector denotes variables subject to 
elimination in the general-to-specific reduction. 
Full results of the final specification are provided in the Appendix, along with summary 
statistics on included variables.  The more interesting results are presented in Table 2, 
below.  As the dependent variable is the principal component of the ignorance measures, 
the coefficients tell us the proportion of a standard deviation move in the dependent 
variable correlated with a unit move in the independent variable.  So, having internet 
access reduces ignorance by 0.07 standard deviations.  Being male reduces ignorance by 
0.18 standard deviations.  Having a university education reduces ignorance by 0.37 
standard deviations, as does being employed in farming.  As compared to political 
centrists, those with a left wing ideology are far more politically informed; holding a 
right-wing ideology had no significant effect.  Those unable to state a political ideology 
are more than a half a standard deviation more ignorant than others: the single largest 
effect in absolute terms.14 
Membership in many organizations affects ignorance directly.  Members of political 
interest groups, churches and community service groups are less ignorant than others, 
though the effects often depend on active or very active membership.  All levels of 
activity, from basic membership through very active membership, were included in the 
initial specification; the table below includes only those variables that survived the  
                                                 
14 Inability to state one’s political ideology may well be a measure that ought to have been included in the 
principal component analysis establishing the ignorance variable.  However, I wish later to use ignorance to 
explain party choice.  If a Green Party supporter identifies with neither the left nor the right but rather along 
a second environmentalist dimension, or if a Maori Party supporter identifies with a third ethnically-based 
dimension, we’re constrained against examining that possibility if this measure is included as part of the 
overall ignorance measure. 
Table 2: Correlates of ignorance 
 Ignorance 
Lack of interest in politics 
(1=very interested; 4= not at all interested) 
0.082 
[3.69]** 
Seek out news about politics? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.09 
[2.42]* 
Pay no attention to political news 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.198 
[3.68]** 
Follow political news on internet 
(1=not at all, 4=often follow) 
-0.068 
[3.54]** 
Follow political news in newspaper 
(1=not at all, 4=often follow) 
-0.08 
[5.12]** 
Very active member of church 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.117 
[3.14]** 
Age 
(years) 
-0.035 
[6.26]** 
gender of respondent 
(0=female, 1=male) 
-0.183 
[6.23]** 
Some tertiary education 
(0=no, 1=yes; less than secondary omitted) 
-0.145 
[4.38]** 
University educated 
(0=no, 1=yes; less than secondary omitted) 
-0.369 
[8.45]** 
managerial 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) 
-0.169 
[2.70]** 
Tech 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) 
-0.255 
[4.16]** 
Clerical 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) 
-0.262 
[4.16]** 
Farming 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) 
-0.377 
[4.66]** 
Parents expressed political preference 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.153 
[5.12]** 
Maori ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.374 
[9.31]** 
receives domestic purposes benefit 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.149 
[2.17]* 
Household income <$15,900 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.125 
[2.11]* 
Household income >$120,000 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.177 
[3.66]** 
Don’t know household income 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.214 
[4.96]** 
Left wing 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.302 
[8.67]** 
Don’t know own ideology 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.588 
[15.21]** 
Country’s financial outlook better for next year 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.132 
[3.39]** 
Previous government performance good 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.09 
[2.89]** 
Dependent variable: Principal component of ignorance measures.  Adjusted R-squared: 0.47, N=3217 
Absolute value of t-Statistics in parentheses;  *=5%, **=1% threshold.  Full specification in appendix.  
Note that standard errors have not been corrected for the general-to-specific reduction; however, each 
variable here reported was significant at the 5% level in the initial specification before reduction.  Results 
of initial specification available on request. 
general-to-specific reduction and that were statistically significant at the five percent 
level in the initial specification. 
III.1: Effects of ignorance: policy preference 
If ignorance is unbiased, then it should not have predictive power in explaining 
preferences after controlling for the demographic variables that explain ignorance itself.  
I brought ignorance over onto the right hand side of the equation for testing:  
0:unbiased is Ignorance  :0 =
++++=
θ
ωGβXθPolicy
H
Ignorance εα
 
where Policy is a vector of many policy questions and other variables are as earlier 
described.  If ignorance is unbiased, then 0=θ .  I began by testing the effects of 
ignorance on economic thinking, with results presented in Table 3, below.  All of the 
control variables used in the final ignorance specification here again are used, but only 
the interesting ones are reported.15 
Political ignorance is among the strongest negative predictors of agreement with 
economists on matters of positive economics.  Recall that our economic index is 
constructed with mean zero and standard deviation one.  A standard deviation increase in 
political ignorance results in a 0.23 standard deviation reduction in the index of economic 
thinking.  Having high income, a university education, and being male all strongly 
influence economic thinking. 
Caplan (2001, 2007) examines differences between economists and the public on matters 
of positive economics, finding that being male, well educated, and having positive 
income growth all correlate with thinking like an economist.  Results here are broadly 
consistent with his findings, though our questions address a mix of positive and 
normative considerations.  Caplan ascribes some of his results on expected income 
growth to general optimism about long-run economic trends.  Caplan’s survey data 
comes from 1996 – in the lead-up to a nice run of economic growth.  Here, those with a  
                                                 
15 Full results are, of course, available on request. 
Table 3: Economic Thinking   
 Economic Thinking 
(t-statistic) 
Political ignorance measure 
(Mean zero, sd 1; higher number = more ignorant) 
-0.229 
[10.66]** 
Have internet 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.157 
[3.76]** 
gender of respondent 
(0=female, 1=male) 
0.254 
[7.15]** 
Some tertiary education 
(0=no, 1=yes; less than secondary omitted) 
0.099 
[2.49]* 
University educated 
(0=no, 1=yes; less than secondary omitted) 
0.286 
[5.47]** 
Home owner 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.164 
[3.73]** 
European ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.141 
[2.76]** 
Maori ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.308 
[6.28]** 
High income 
(0=no; 1= income > $120,000) 
0.391 
[6.83]** 
Don’t know income 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.141 
[2.66]** 
Left wing ideology 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.202 
[4.82]** 
Don’t know own ideology 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.046 
[0.95] 
Good household financial situation vs last year 
(1= better ; 0= equal or worse) 
0.101 
[2.58]** 
Good state of the economy vs last year 
(1=better, 0= equal or worse) 
-0.068 
[1.74] 
Better expectation for national economy next year 
(1= better ; 0= equal or worse) 
-0.087 
[1.87] 
Dependent variable: principal component economic index. 
2984 observations, Adjusted R2 = 0.3.   
more pessimistic outlook about the general economy are more likely to think like an 
economist: it may be that results here and in Caplan’s work suggest that those more likely 
to think like economists are those better able to forecast broad economic trends. 
I then went on to test the effects of ignorance on a broader set of policy variables.  The 
general regression equation is as described above, except that “economic thinking” is 
added as an element of X.  Maintaining the exact same set of covariates in both the 
ignorance and the policy and party specifications introduces an identification issue: as the 
latter specifications effectively are regressing on the residual of ignorance from the first 
specification, the error structure from the first specification is brought into the latter 
specifications.16  To address this issue, I’ve run versions of the latter specifications first 
with the exact same set of covariates as in the ignorance specification, then with the 
addition of the “economic thinking” index, then with removal of some elements of G, 
then with the addition of all of the elements of G dropped in the initial general-to-specific 
specification reduction.  The coefficient on the ignorance variable doesn’t move 
substantially except with the addition of the “economic thinking” variable, which 
typically reduces the magnitude and significance of the ignorance variable.  Simply 
including the economic thinking variable does not solve the identification issue given that 
ignorance also predicts economic thinking; however, robustness of results on ignorance 
given various permutations of G lends confidence to my overall results. 
As ignorance negatively predicts economic thinking,17 the economic thinking variable 
picks up some of the effects of ignorance, attenuating my results.   For example, 
ignorance strongly predicts agreeing that “big business has too much power” when 
economic thinking is not included but not at all when economic thinking is included.  
Attitudes toward taxation and redistribution behave similarly.  To the extent that my 
ignorance variable may be picking up individual characteristics omitted from the survey, 
such as elements of worldview not incorporated into the ideology measure, inclusion of 
the “economic thinking” variable may assist in mopping up some of the effects of the 
ignorance variable that may be due to things other than core ignorance.   
Results for individual policies are presented in Tables 4 and 5, below.  Each row 
represents a separate specification, with independent variables listed as columns.  In each 
case, all variables used to explain ignorance from the final specification above are used in 
conjunction with ignorance and economic thinking as independent variables.  Full 
regression results from each specification are available on request.  While the dependent 
variable is categorical, OLS regression was conducted in each case for ease of coefficient 
                                                 
16 I thank Peter Phillips for pointing this out and Les Oxley and Bob Reed for explaining the point to me. 
17 The raw correlation in the data is -0.39. 
interpretation.  Ordered logit specifications also were conducted: regressing predicted 
dependent variables from OLS on the predicted dependent variables from ordered logit 
specifications typically yielded very high r-squared values (above 0.98) and eliciting 
marginal effects from dozens of ordered logit specifications proved computationally 
intensive, so OLS was retained.  In all cases, “don’t know” answers were dropped from 
the analysis as simply assigning them to the centre of the range would have biased results 
where “don’t know” answers correlate with ignorance.18 
In many of the tested policies, ignorance has predictive power independently of the 
variables that predict ignorance, despite that our procedure necessarily induces strong 
multicollinarity.  I checked joint significance of the ignorance variable across all 
specifications: a chi-squared test performed after running the set of equations as a system 
of seemingly-unrelated regressions strongly rejects that the coefficient on ignorance is 
equal to zero across the nine specifications.19   
Turning to preferences over economic policies, we find in Table 5 (below) that ignorance 
affects preferences over economic policy even after controlling for economic thinking.20  
The politically ignorant are more likely to support tax reductions (despite earlier being 
shown to favour increased spending in most areas), less likely to support government 
ownership or regulation of Kiwibank, Landcorp and electricity generation, and more 
likely to agree that welfare benefits make people dependent and that the unemployed 
should be made to work for their benefits.   
  
                                                 
18 Future work will examine the effect of ignorance in predicting “don’t know” answers more generally. 
19 Χ2 (9) = 37.45; p = 0.0000.  Coefficients reported are from separate OLS specifications; the SUREG 
procedure allowed for testing of joint significance across all specifications.  There are no substantial 
differences in coefficients between the separate OLS specifications and the SUREG specification: the effect 
of ignorance on preferences over genetically-modified foods becomes significant in the SUREG 
specification and doubles in magnitude; other coefficients are not greatly affected.  I retained results from 
OLS specifications because SUREG requires the same observations across all specifications, restricting 
analysis to responses providing non-“don’t know” answers across the set of all policy questions.  Where the 
number of observations varies from 2600 to 2950 across separate specifications, the SUREG procedure 
drops N to 2365 for all specifications. 
20 I again tested joint significance of the ignorance variable using the seemingly-unrelated regression 
technique.  Results under SUREG were very similar to those under OLS.  The Χ2 test again strongly rejects 
that the joint coefficient estimate is zero (Χ2 (10)=26.57, p=0.0030). 
Table 4: Ignorance and policy preference 
Policy variable 
Policy 
Mean, 
Std. Dev.
Ignorance Economic Thinking 
Very active 
church 
member 
Male University degree 
High 
income Left wing 
Adj. 
R2 
Protect environment even if lowers 
income     (1=yes, 7=no) 
3.40 
(1.46) 
0.04 
(0.98) 
0.11 
(3.49)** 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.11 
(1.87) 
-0.41 
(4.65)** 
-0.05 
(0.56) 
-0.72 
(10.12)** 0.11 
GM foods relatively safe 
(1=strongly agree; 5=st. disagree) 
2.93 
(1.09) 
0.05 
(1.83) 
-0.13 
(5.11)** 
0.13 
(2.10)* 
-0.25 
(5.22)** 
0.05 
(0.73) 
-0.25 
(3.23)** 
0.27 
(4.71)** 0.12 
Tax and redistribution 
(1=more redist; 7=less) 
4.14 
(1.60) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
0.32 
(9.15)** 
-0.28 
(3.37)** 
-0.17 
(2.52)* 
-0.11 
(1.16) 
0.38 
(3.65)** 
-0.81 
(10.38)** 0.20 
Assist low income families 
(1=much more; 5=much less) 
2.48 
(0.99) 
-0.05 
(2.07)* 
0.16 
(8.65)** 
-0.21 
(4.65)** 
0.03 
(0.95) 
0.09 
(1.61) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.22 
(5.22)** 0.29 
Environmental spending  
(1=much more; 5=much less) 
2.52 
(0.77) 
-0.03 
(1.50) 
0.08 
(4.81)** 
0.00 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(1.09) 
-0.16 
(3.41)** 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.26 
(7.16)** 0.11 
Health spending 
(1=much more; 5=much less) 
1.86 
(0.73) 
-0.06 
(3.10)** 
0.12 
(7.70)** 
-0.01 
(0.21) 
0.16 
(5.30)** 
0.13 
(3.00)** 
0.14 
(2.97)** 
-0.05 
(1.33) 0.10 
Defence spending 
(1=much more; 5=much less) 
2.73 
(0.97) 
-0.01 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.57) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
-0.06 
(1.50) 
0.30 
(5.09)** 
0.09 
(1.48) 
0.47 
(10.16)** 0.12 
Death penalty reinstatement 
(1=strongly agree; 5 = st. disagree) 
2.70 
(1.40) 
-0.18 
(5.32)** 
0.25 
(8.81)** 
0.40 
(5.83)** 
-0.25 
(4.58)** 
0.67 
(8.32)** 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.36 
(5.65)** 0.20 
Homosexuality is wrong 
(1=strongly agree, 5 = st. disagree) 
3.34 
(1.31) 
-0.03 
(0.86) 
0.19 
(7.62)** 
-0.86 
(14.21)** 
-0.43 
(8.86)** 
0.27 
(3.79)** 
0.14 
(1.79) 
0.47 
(8.26)** 0.25 
Remove Treaty references 
(1=strongly agree, 5 = st. disagree) 
2.93 
(1.46) 
-0.05 
(1.80) 
-0.07 
(2.72)** 
0.22 
(3.59)** 
-0.19 
(4.02)** 
0.43 
(6.11)** 
0.06 
(0.75) 
0.58 
(10.24)** 0.44 
Dependent variable listed in first column; each row presents a separate specification.  Second column provides summary statistics on the 
dependent variable; subsequent columns provide coefficients on independent variables with t-statistics listed in parentheses. * and ** denote 5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Table 5: Ignorance and economic policy preference 
Dependent policy variable Policy 
Mean, 
Std Dev. 
Ignorance Economic Thinking Male 
University 
degree 
Maori 
ethnicity 
High 
income Left wing Adj.R
2 
Reduce taxes in general 
(1 = strongly support; 5 = st. oppose) 
2.13 
(0.97) 
-0.06 
(2.38)* 
0.10 
(4.81)** 
0.09 
(2.31)* 
0.25 
(4.43)** 
-0.05 
(0.88) 
-0.09 
(1.38) 
0.54 
(11.86)** 0.17 
Govt ownership Kiwibank 
(1 = fully own; 4 = not own or regulate) 
1.98 
(1.11) 
0.10 
(3.37)* 
0.18 
(7.51)** 
-0.04 
(0.78) 
0.08 
(1.08) 
-0.07 
(0.99) 
0.31 
(4.07)** 
-0.25 
(4.56)** 0.10 
Govt ownership Landcorp 
(1 = fully own; 4 = not own or reg) 
2.04 
(1.05) 
0.12 
(3.80)** 
0.15 
(6.09)** 
-0.11 
(2.30)* 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.07 
(0.98) 
0.11 
(1.42) 
-0.26 
(4.62)** 0.06 
Govt ownership electricity generation 
(1 = fully own; 4 = not own or reg) 
1.95 
(0.98) 
0.06 
(2.36)* 
0.16 
(7.45)** 
-0.17 
(3.93)** 
0.06 
(1.03) 
0.11 
(1.83) 
0.07 
(1.10) 
-0.12 
(2.48)* 0.05 
Govt ownership Television NZ 
(1 = fully own; 4 = not own or reg) 
2.38 
(1.14) 
0.04 
(1.20) 
0.18 
(7.41)** 
-0.06 
(1.27) 
-0.09 
(1.30) 
-0.11 
(1.66) 
0.09 
(1.19) 
-0.18 
(3.19)** 0.09 
Unemployed should work for benefit 
(1= strongly support; 5= st. oppose) 
2.18 
(1.01) 
-0.09 
(3.47)** 
0.07 
(3.53)** 
0.10 
(2.55)* 
0.25 
(4.25)** 
0.17 
(3.04)** 
0.17 
(0.26) 
0.40 
(8.48)** 0.14 
Welfare benefits make people dependent 
(1 = strongly support; 5 = st. oppose) 
2.41 
(1.17) 
-0.09 
(3.29)** 
0.09 
(3.61)** 
-0.07 
(1.56) 
0.28 
(4.06)** 
0.18 
(2.83)** 
-0.17 
(2.27)* 
0.53 
(9.81)** 0.16 
Trade unions protect workers 
(1 = strongly support; 5 = st. oppose) 
2.27 
(0.99) 
-0.00 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(7.66)** 
-0.04 
(0.97) 
0.02 
(0.29) 
-0.16 
(3.05)** 
0.16 
(2.56)* 
-0.29 
(6.55)** 0.20 
Big business has too much power 
(1 = strongly support; 5 = st. oppose) 
2.52 
(1.03) 
-0.00 
(0.18) 
0.31 
(15.55)** 
-0.09 
(2.37)* 
0.05 
(0.91)* 
-0.24 
(4.37)** 
0.31 
(4.94)** 
-0.41 
(8.86)** 0.25 
Trade unions have too much power 
(1 = strongly support; 5 = st. oppose) 
3.13 
(0.97) 
-0.02 
(0.88) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
-0.02 
(0.44) 
0.14 
(2.33)* 
0.05 
(0.89) 
-0.16 
(2.51)* 
0.39 
(8.48)** 0.11 
Dependent variable listed in first column; each row presents a separate specification.  Second column provides summary statistics on the 
dependent variable; subsequent columns provide coefficients on independent variables with t-statistics listed in parentheses. * and ** denote 5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Results also prove economically significant in many cases.  Recall that our ignorance 
variable is mean zero, standard deviation one by construction.  Consequently, a standard 
deviation increase in ignorance correlates with a 0.05 standard deviation increase in 
support for assistance to low-income families, a 0.06 standard deviation increase in 
support for health spending, and a 0.18 standard deviation increase in support for the 
death penalty.  While these effects aren’t huge in absolute terms, they are often 
comparatively large.  Being a very active church member reduces support for the death 
penalty by only about twice as much as a standard deviation decrease in ignorance.  The 
distance between the maximum and minimum ignorance scores is 4.95.  Consequently, a 
rough guide to the maximal effects of ignorance can be found by multiplying the 
ignorance coefficient by five.  This effect is generally comparable to the effect of moving 
from the lowest level of education to having a university degree.  Table 6, below, 
presents comparisons between the effects of the maximal increase in education (from less 
than secondary school to gaining a university degree), as compared to the maximal 
reduction in ignorance in cases where both coefficients are significant at the ten percent 
level.   
Table 6: Ignorance versus education 
Policy variable 
Ignorance 
(max to min) 
University 
degree 
Death penalty reinstatement 0.89 0.75 
Remove Treaty references 0.25 0.40 
Reduce taxes in general 0.30 0.24 
Govt ownership Kiwibank -0.50 0.21 
Govt ownership electricity generation -0.30 0.18 
Unemployed should work for benefit 0.42 0.19 
Welfare benefits make people dependent 0.46 0.33 
Coefficients on university degree here differ from those in the previous tables.  The prior 
specifications omitted both secondary and less than secondary schooling; we here compare 
against less than secondary schooling to provide the maximal effect for a tertiary degree. 
In most cases, the effect of ignorance reduction runs in the same direction as gaining a 
University degree.  However, a reduction in ignorance correlates with reduced skepticism 
of government ownership of strategic industries while gaining a university degree has the 
opposite effect.  The effect of reductions in ignorance often greatly outweighs the effect 
of gaining a university degree when both are statistically significant.  This suggests that 
ignorance is of real world importance.   
III.2: Effects of Ignorance: Party Preference 
Political ignorance correlates reasonably strongly with policy preferences.  As 
demonstrated in Table 7, below, it also correlates with voting behavior and party 
preference.  Each column presents the important results from separate probit 
specifications; marginal effects reported.  Except where noted, the standard set of control 
variables was used, but only the interesting results are reported.21  The politically ignorant 
are somewhat less likely to vote, with a standard deviation increase in ignorance reducing 
the probability of voting by 1.5%.  While rational instrumental agents should not vote, 
those with better understanding of economics are here no less likely to vote than are 
others.  As many economists seem determined to defy their models’ predictions and vote 
regardless, I don’t take this as undermining the face validity of my measure of “economic 
thinking”. 
In the party support specifications, I restricted the sample to those reporting having voted.  
When they get to the polls, the ignorant are significantly more likely to support the 
Labour Party (4% increase in predicted probability for a standard deviation increase in 
ignorance) and significantly less likely to support the Green party (1% decrease in 
predicted probability) and United Future (0.5% decrease in predicted probability).  
Understanding economics strongly predicted supporting National in 2005, which comes 
as little surprise: the National Party leader was former Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand.  A standard deviation increase in our “economic thinking” index correlates 
with a 5.7% increased probability of voting National, a 1.5% decreased probability of  
                                                 
21 The robustness checks described earlier – modifying the set of G control variables -- also were here 
conducted.  The only substantial difference was that ignorance becomes significant in predicting support 
for New Zealand First when the “kitchen sink” set of initial variables are used as covariates.  In that 
specification, a standard deviation increase in ignorance correlates with a 1% increase in the probability of 
voting for New Zealand First.  I also ran specifications adding all policy preferences into the party choice 
regressions.  In those specifications, ignorance more strongly predicts voting Labour (0.05, z=3.45) and 
more weakly predicts not supporting United Future (-0.003, z=2.78) or the Green Party (-0.006, z=2.85). 
Table 7: Ignorance and voting behavior 
 Not 
Voting 
Labour National Act 
Ignorance 
(Mean zero, standard deviation 1) 
0.015 
[5.56]** 
0.039 
[2.71]** 
0.007 
[0.65] 
-0.001 
[0.67] 
Economics index 
(Mean zero, standard deviation 1) 
0.002 
[0.62] 
-0.008 
[0.63] 
0.057 
[6.02]** 
-0.001 
[0.65] 
Have internet 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.023 
[3.65]** 
-0.021 
[0.78] 
0.035 
[1.68] 
0.004 
[1.98]* 
Very active member of church 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.003 
[0.44] 
-0.025 
[0.85] 
-0.079 
[4.21]** 
-0.002 
[1.04] 
gender of respondent 
(0=female, 1=male) 
-0.003 
[0.70] 
-0.051 
[2.19]* 
-0.036 
[1.99]* 
0.001 
[0.32] 
University educated 
(0=no, 1=yes; less than secondary omitted) 
0.008 
[0.93] 
-0.019 
[0.57] 
-0.009 
[0.35] 
-0.003 
[1.83] 
Currently student 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.009 
[1.36] 
-0.049 
[1.06] 
0.01 
[0.22] 
0.003 
[0.45] 
Farming 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) 
0.027 
[1.71] 
-0.237 
[3.70]** 
0.151 
[2.42]* 
0.014 
[1.41] 
European ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.001 
[0.19] 
-0.038 
[1.13] 
0.076 
[2.58]** 
0.003 
[0.99] 
Maori ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.001 
[0.21] 
0.017 
[0.54] 
-0.215 
[9.42]** 
-0.002 
[0.93] 
Asian ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.014 
[0.90] 
-0.069 
[0.95] 
0.269 
[3.67]** 
0.028 
[2.06]* 
Receives NZ Superannuation 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.011 
[1.58] 
-0.046 
[1.19] 
-0.03 
[1.02] 
0.007 
[1.71] 
Receives family assistance 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.011 
[1.39] 
0.02 
[0.49] 
-0.064 
[1.87] 
-0.003 
[0.74] 
Household income >$120,000 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.009 
[1.02] 
-0.051 
[1.34] 
0.039 
[1.39] 
0.005 
[1.60] 
Divorced 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.011 
[1.79] 
-0.088 
[2.54]* 
-0.039 
[1.28] 
0.001 
[0.28] 
Left wing 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.008 
[1.36] 
0.253 
[9.58]** 
-0.237 
[11.92]** 
-0.006 
[2.28]* 
Don’t know own ideology 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.007 
[1.55] 
0.104 
[3.27]** 
-0.064 
[2.89]** 
0 
[0.16] 
Good household financial situation vs last 
year (1= better ; 0= equal or worse) 
-0.001 
[0.23] 
-0.005 
[0.21] 
-0.023 
[1.16] 
0.006 
[2.36]* 
Good state of the economy vs last year 
(1=better, 0= equal or worse) 
-0.002 
[0.40] 
0.101 
[4.07]** 
-0.052 
[2.72]** 
-0.003 
[1.73] 
Expect better national economy next year 
(1= better ; 0= equal or worse) 
-0.008 
[1.49] 
0.083 
[2.86]** 
-0.062 
[2.46]* 
-0.003 
[0.97] 
Don’t know previous govt performance 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.015 
[1.30] 
0.344 
[5.65]** 
-0.122 
[4.49]** 
-0.002 
[0.57] 
Previous government performance good 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.006 
[1.17] 
0.443 
[17.98]** 
-0.31 
[15.35]** 
-0.003 
[1.45] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.24 0.44 0.23 
Probit specifications, marginal effects reported.   
Table 7(continued): Ignorance and voting behavior 
 NZ First UF Green Maori 
Ignorance 
(Mean zero, standard deviation 1) 
0.006 
[1.21] 
-0.005 
[3.27]** 
-0.013 
[3.15]** 
-0.002 
[0.69] 
Economics index 
(Mean zero, standard deviation 1) 
-0.015 
[3.17]** 
-0.004 
[2.87]** 
-0.001 
[0.47] 
-0.004 
[2.12]* 
Have internet 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.008 
[0.77] 
0.005 
[1.80] 
0.008 
[1.01] 
-0.004 
[0.87] 
Very active member of church 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.007 
[0.63] 
0.049 
[8.12]** 
-0.009 
[1.16] 
0.004 
[0.82] 
gender of respondent 
(0=female, 1=male) 
0.022 
[2.36]* 
-0.004 
[1.81] 
0.008 
[1.35] 
0.01 
[2.60]** 
University educated 
(0=no, 1=yes; less than secondary omitted) 
-0.034 
[2.63]** 
0.004 
[1.09] 
0.02 
[2.08]* 
0.014 
[2.08]* 
Currently student 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.032 
[1.55] 
0.004 
[0.65] 
0.001 
[0.05] 
0.012 
[1.41] 
Farming 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) 
0.043 
[1.50] 
-0.006 
[1.28] 
0.093 
[1.73] 
-0.008 
[0.96] 
European ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.011 
[0.88] 
0.002 
[0.54] 
0.018 
[2.39]* 
-0.014 
[3.06]** 
Maori ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.014 
[1.09] 
-0.01 
[2.94]** 
-0.007 
[0.91] 
0.2 
[12.03]** 
Asian ethnicity 
(0=no, 1=yes)  
0 
[0.01] 
-0.018 
[1.13] 
-0.01 
[0.80] 
Receives NZ Superannuation 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.029 
[1.81] 
0.001 
[0.21] 
0.023 
[1.81] 
-0.005 
[0.90] 
Receives family assistance 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.06 
[3.04]** 
-0.004 
[1.17] 
-0.014 
[1.37] 
0.007 
[1.08] 
Household income >$120,000 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.01 
[0.61] 
-0.002 
[0.69] 
-0.001 
[0.07] 
-0.001 
[0.14] 
Divorced 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.012 
[0.82] 
0.006 
[1.26] 
0.051 
[3.98]** 
-0.002 
[0.35] 
Left wing 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.039 
[3.88]** 
-0.006 
[2.47]* 
0.07 
[7.29]** 
0.005 
[1.11] 
Don’t know own ideology 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.026 
[2.48]* 
0.012 
[2.45]* 
0.029 
[2.40]* 
0.003 
[0.58] 
Good household financial situation vs last 
year (1= better ; 0= equal or worse) 
0.006 
[0.57] 
-0.002 
[0.93] 
0.004 
[0.60] 
-0.003 
[0.77] 
Good state of the economy vs last year 
(1=better, 0= equal or worse) 
0.003 
[0.29] 
0.001 
[0.34] 
-0.012 
[2.01]* 
0.005 
[1.05] 
Expect better national economy next year 
(1= better ; 0= equal or worse) 
-0.025 
[2.40]* 
0.006 
[1.41] 
0.002 
[0.22] 
-0.006 
[1.48] 
Don’t know previous govt performance 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
0.013 
[0.55] 
0.006 
[0.95] 
0.038 
[1.55] 
-0.006 
[0.88] 
Previous government performance good 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.003 
[0.36] 
-0.004 
[1.54] 
0.021 
[3.07]** 
-0.024 
[4.75]** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.29 0.23 0.40 
Probit specification; marginal effects reported.  Asian ethnicity predicts failure perfectly in the NZ First 
specification and is dropped.  
voting NZ First, and a slight decrease in the probability of voting United Future and 
Maori. 
Karp (2005) argues that the New Zealand Election Survey suggests voter ignorance does 
not affect voter behavior.  Karp analyzes data from the 1996 and 1999 NZES and finds 
that individuals with less knowledge of the effects of the party vote are no more likely 
incorrectly to cast a split-ticket ballot and are no less likely to vote sincerely.  My study 
differs from his in a few ways.  First, I take a much broader conception of political 
ignorance.  Second, I am far more interested in whether political ignorance affects party 
and policy preference than in whether it affects voter strategies.  Regardless of its effects 
on split or straight ticket voting, ignorance seems to matter in determining the content of 
the ballot.  Karp sought to determine whether MMP was too complicated for voters to 
understand; I here am examining whether ignorance affects party and policy preferences. 
Inability to place oneself on an ideological spectrum was left out of the construction of 
the ignorance index because it seemed likely that non-traditional parties’ supporters 
might well identify themselves as being off the standard spectrum.  We here find indeed 
that while a standard deviation increase in ignorance decreases the probability of 
supporting the Greens by 1.3%, not identifying oneself on the ideological spectrum 
correlates with a 2.9% increased probability of supporting the Green Party.  Inability to 
place oneself on the spectrum also correlates with a 10.4% increased chance of 
supporting Labour and a 6.4% reduced chance of supporting National: in that case, it 
seems more likely that inability to place oneself on the spectrum more properly can be 
viewed as a part of overall ignorance. 
We typically view voters as being more likely to support the incumbent when economic 
times are good and more likely to support challengers when the economy fares poorly: 
economic retrospective voting.22  Whether voters base such decisions on their own 
economic circumstances (egocentric voting) or on overall economic conditions 
(sociotropic voting) remains a matter of some debate (Caplan, 2002).  Results here 
suggest sociotropic voting.  Improvements in one’s own financial situation are 
                                                 
22 See Mueller (2003) at section 19.3 for a survey of the literature. 
uncorrelated with voting decisions while perceptions of the general state of the economy, 
expectations of the subsequent year’s economic performance, and one’s overall 
evaluation of the previous government’s performance all correlate strongly with voter 
choices: in all cases, perceived good times correlate with support for the incumbent.  
Someone rating the economy as having improved over the prior year was 10% more 
likely to support the incumbent Labour government and 5% less likely to support 
National.  Interestingly, those responding “don’t know” when asked about the previous 
government’s performance were 34% more likely to support Labour. 
Other interesting findings include that voters with internet access are less likely to vote 
but more likely to support National, Act and United Future, that very active church 
members are about 8% less likely to support National and 5% more likely to support 
United Future, that Labour’s play for the student vote with zero percent student loans 
seems not to have paid off as neither current nor former university students were more 
likely to support Labour in 2005, that Maori were 21.5% less likely to support National in 
a somewhat racially-charged election, that New Zealand First drew disproportionate 
support both from superannuitants and from those on family assistance, that those on high 
incomes weren’t particularly likely to support any party but that the divorced were almost 
9% less likely to support Labour and 5% more likely to support the Greens. 
III.4: Cueing: meliorating ignorance? 
The evidence here presented rather strongly suggests that political ignorance is not 
unbiased.  We cannot rely on the law of large numbers to protect us from its effects.  As 
noted earlier, however, the effects of ignorance on policy preference may be attenuated 
by the availability of useful cue-givers: people on whom the ignorant can rely in helping 
them to make political decisions.  If Lupia’s argument is correct, the politically ignorant 
who are members of useful cue-giving organizations will behave more like others to 
whom they are otherwise similar.  If we repeat each of the prior specifications, but 
interact the ignorance variable with membership in any such organization, we should find 
that the interaction term is significant and opposite in sign to the ignorance term.  If the 
interaction terms do not attenuate the effects of ignorance, we might be less confident in 
Lupia’s cue-giving mechanisms and in Wittman’s use of them to generate optimistic 
conclusions about the effects of political ignorance. 
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I began by defining group membership very broadly: indicating membership in a union, 
professional, business, environmental social, community, sports or hobby organization or 
club, church, special interest group, or whanau organization was sufficient.  With this 
broad definition, 76% of respondents were members of a potentially cue-giving 
organization.  All prior regressions were re-run using this broad conception of group 
membership.  In 29 regressions, 17 had interaction terms with opposite sign to the 
ignorance variable; in 12 cases, they ran in the same direction.  Table 8, below, lists the 
specifications in which the point estimate for ignorance fell outside the 90% confidence 
interval for the linear combination of the interaction term with ignorance: in other words, 
the cases in which the ignorance term was significantly different from its joint effect with 
the interaction of ignorance with group membership.  In four cases, group membership 
significantly attenuated effects; in two cases, it significantly exacerbated effects.  In 
seven specifications,23 ignorance had a significant effect that was not offset by group 
membership. 
I then narrowed the definition of group membership by dropping membership in sports, 
social and hobby groups, leaving 65% of respondents as group members.  Again, all prior 
regressions were re-run.  This time, 16 had interaction terms with opposite sign to the 
ignorance variable, with 13 running in the same direction.  The interaction term 
attenuates the effects of ignorance in three specifications and exacerbates it in two 
specifications; details are provided in column 3 of Table 7.  In nine specifications,24 
ignorance had a significant effect not offset by group membership. 
                                                 
23 Health spending, death penalty, government ownership of LandCorp, unemployed should work for 
benefits, welfare encourages dependence, economic thinking, and likelihood of voting.  Significance here 
and below evaluated at the 10% level. 
24 Health spending, death penalty, generalized tax reductions, government ownership of LandCorp, 
government ownership of the electricity commission, unemployed should work for benefits, welfare 
encourages dependence, economic thinking, and likelihood of voting.  
Narrowing the definition of group membership still further, including only members of 
unions, professional associations, business organizations, environmental groups and 
special interest groups, left us with 41% of respondents as members of an organization.  
Fourteen specifications produced interaction terms with coefficients of opposite sign to 
the ignorance variable.  In four cases, group membership significantly attenuated the 
effects of ignorance; in two cases, it significantly exacerbated ignorance’s effects; details 
are listed in column 4 of Table 7.  Ignorance’s significant effects on policy preferences 
failed to be significantly attenuated by group membership in thirteen specifications.25   
Table 8: Testing Lupia 
Specification Broad group definition Middle group definition Narrow group definition 
 Ignorance Interaction Ignorance Interaction Ignorance Interaction 
GM foods relatively safe 0.13 (2.57)** 
-0.10 
(1.91) 
0.12 
(2.73)** 
-0.09 
(1.98)*   
Assist low income families -0.11 (2.91)** 
0.08 
(2.20)* 
-0.13 
(3.99)** 
0.12 
(3.62)** 
-0.09 
(3.61)** 
0.12 
(3.71)** 
Homosexuality is wrong  -0.01 (0.28) 
0.07 
(1.26)   
0.07 
(2.02)** 
-0.07 
(1.53) 
Government ownership of 
Kiwibank    
0.03 
(0.66) 
0.10 
(2.22)*   
Unemployed should work 
for benefits      
-0.05 
(1.68) 
-0.09 
(2.41)* 
Business has too much 
power     
-0.03 
(0.95) 
0.05 
(1.44) 
Labour support  0.02 (0.67) 
0.03 
(1.15) 
0.02 
(0.95) 
0.03 
(1.24)   
NZ First support     0.01 (2.20)* 
-0.02 
(2.18*) 
United Future support -0.02 (1.95) 
0.01 
(1.72) 
-0.01 
(2.46) 
0.004 
(0.98)   
Green Party support -0.004 (0.61) 
-0.01 
(1.47)   
-0.01 
(1.33) 
-0.01 
(1.50) 
Table lists the specifications in which the interaction of ignorance and group membership significantly 
affected the effects of ignorance on the dependent variable listed in the first column.  Each column presents 
summary results of 29 separate specifications, listing only cases where the point estimate on ignorance fell 
outside of the 90% confidence interval for the sum of ignorance and the interaction term. 
                                                 
25 Genetically modified foods are relatively safe, environmental spending, health spending, death penalty, 
generalized tax reductions, government ownership of Kiwibank, government ownership of LandCorp, 
government ownership of the electricity commission, welfare encourages dependence, economic thinking, 
likelihood of voting, support for the Labour party, support for United Future. 
On the whole, the analysis here suggests that Lupia’s cueing mechanisms are not 
particularly potent.  While membership in cue-giving groups sometimes attenuates the 
effects of ignorance, it also often amplifies those effects.  For the most part, such 
membership plays no significant role in channeling ignorance’s effects in either direction: 
ignorance correlates strongly with preferences regardless of the availability of relevant 
cue-givers. 
IV.  Conclusion 
If ignorance were unbiased, or if the politically ignorant had easy recourse to cue-givers 
who successfully helped them to behave as though they were fully informed, we would 
have fewer worries about the potential for political failure.  Nobody expects widespread 
market failure from that most people don’t know how car engines run; consumers in 
political markets could similarly be able to function well despite knowing very little 
about the operation of the political process.  Using a dataset allowing for testing of 
ignorance’s effects, I here have shown that ignorance correlates reasonably strongly with 
policy and party preferences and with failure to understand economics.  Moreover, the 
effects are not trivial, often well outpacing the effects of education.  Even worse, 
membership in the types of organizations most likely able to provide adequate cue-givers 
fails to substantially attenuate ignorance’s effects.  We can perhaps take some comfort in 
that the politically ignorant also are somewhat less likely to vote.  While Wittman’s tales 
of democratic efficiency are comforting, we ought not take too much solace from them. 
While I have shown that ignorance causes bias, it would be far too hasty to say that 
ignorant Kiwis are generally biased towards the New Zealand Labour Party.  Results here 
could simply reflect incumbency bias.  Alternatively, the pattern could well be explained 
under rational expectations where the Labour Party promised to undertake more 
regulatory measures to protect people from the consequences of their choices, and the 
politically ignorant could perhaps be more likely to be in need of such protection.  
Isolation of incumbency effects versus biases towards the Labour Party would require 
analysis of prior years of the New Zealand Election Survey when Labour was not the 
incumbent and will be the subject of future work. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Principal Component analysis of ignorance measures. 
Factor   Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 2.00881 1.08339 0.4020 0.4020 
Factor 2 0.92652 0.15955 0.1853 0.5873 
Factor 3 0.76697 0.04950 0.1534 0.7407 
Factor 4 0.71747 0.13835 0.1435 0.8842 
Factor 5 0.57912  0.1158 1.0000 
P>chi2 = 0.0000, N=3743; 1 retained factor. 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness 
Ideology ignorance 0.6801 0.5375 
MMP ignorance 0.6130 0.6242 
Quiz ignorance 0.3764 0.8683 
Previous Govt ignorance 0.7558 0.4287 
Representative ignorance 0.6772 0.5414 
 
Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable N Avg st.dev Min Max
Principal component ignorance measure 3743 0 1 -1.74 3.21
Principal component "economic thinking" 3378 0 1 -3.05 2.66
interest in politics  (1=very; 4= not at all) 3682 2.01 0.77 1 4
Follow political news in newspaper (1=often, 4=not at all) 3479 2.02 0.98 1 4
Follow political news on internet (1=often, 4=not at all) 3718 3.65 0.75 1 4
Age (years) 3639 51.68 16.4 18 103
gender of respondent (0=female, 1=male) 3706 0.44 0.5 0 1
Seek out news about politics? (0=no, 1=yes) 3743 0.19 0.4 0 1
Pay no attention to political news  3743 0.08 0.27 0 1
Have internet  3743 0.66 0.47 0 1
Active member business group  3743 0.07 0.26 0 1
Very active member professional org 3743 0.03 0.18 0 1
Member political interest group 3743 0.79 0.4 0 1
Active member political interest group  3743 0.07 0.26 0 1
Very active member of church  3743 0.16 0.37 0 1
Member community service group  3743 0.69 0.46 0 1
V. active member com. service group  3743 0.12 0.33 0 1
Member hobbies group or club  3743 0.62 0.48 0 1
Member whanau, hapu, other Maori group  3743 0.67 0.47 0 1
Very active member Maori group  3743 0.08 0.27 0 1
Live in town 25K-100K  3743 0.18 0.38 0 1
Live in major city >100K  3743 0.39 0.49 0 1
Secondary school  3743 0.44 0.5 0 1
Some tertiary education  3743 0.25 0.44 0 1
University educated  3743 0.17 0.37 0 1
Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics (continued) 
Variable N Avg st.dev Min Max
Secondary school  3743 0.44 0.5 0 1
Some tertiary education  3743 0.25 0.44 0 1
University educated  3743 0.17 0.37 0 1
Currently student  3743 0.05 0.21 0 1
Unpaid work in home  3743 0.07 0.25 0 1
Managerial  3743 0.12 0.32 0 1
Professional  3743 0.24 0.423 0 1
Tech  3743 0.1 0.31 0 1
Clerical  3743 0.1 0.3 0 1
Service  3743 0.11 0.31 0 1
Trade  3743 0.12 0.32 0 1
Factory 3743 0.04 0.2 0 1
Farming  3743 0.04 0.19 0 1
Parents expressed political preference  3743 0.69 0.46 0 1
Housing status: owner  3743 0.7 0.46 0 1
european ethnicity  3743 0.7 0.46 0 1
maori ethnicity  3743 0.32 0.47 0 1
asian ethnicity  3743 0.03 0.16 0 1
receives sickness benefit  3743 0.09 0.28 0 1
receives dpb  3743 0.04 0.2 0 1
receives family assistance  3743 0.07 0.25 0 1
receives other benefit  3743 0.03 0.17 0 1
No Household Income 3743 0.02 0.14 0 1
Household income <$15,900  3743 0.06 0.23 0 1
Household income $87,600-$119,999  3743 0.1 0.3 0 1
Household income >$120,000  3743 0.09 0.29 0 1
Don’t know household income  3743 0.12 0.33 0 1
partner student  3742 0.01 0.11 0 1
partner in unpaid work outside home  3742 0.01 0.11 0 1
partner in unpaid work in home  3742 0.05 0.21 0 1
Partner in a supervisory position  3743 0.28 0.45 0 1
Left wing  3743 0.2 0.4 0 1
Right wing  3743 0.16 0.37 0 1
Don’t know own ideology  3743 0.17 0.38 0 1
Household financial situation better than last year 3743 0.24 0.43 0 1
Country’s financial situation better than last year 3743 0.26 0.44 0 1
Don’t know country’s financial outlook  3743 0.14 0.34 0 1
Country’s financial outlook better for next year 3743 0.16 0.36 0 1
Don’t know prev. govt performance 3743 0.04 0.21 0 1
Previous government performance good 3743 0.66 0.47 0 1
 
 
Appendix Table 3: Predicting ignorance 
Dependent variable: Ignorance measure (higher = more ignorant) 
 Principal component 
Ignorance measure 
Lack of interest in politics 0.082 
(1=very interested; 4= not at all interested) [3.69]** 
Seek out news about politics? -0.09 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.42]* 
Pay no attention to political news 0.198 
(0=no, 1=yes) [3.68]** 
Have internet -0.079 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.26]* 
Follow political news on internet -0.068 
(1=not at all, 4=often follow) [3.54]** 
Follow political news in newspaper -0.08 
(1=not at all, 4=often follow) [5.12]** 
Active member business group 0.084 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.63] 
Member political interest group -0.124 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.56]* 
Active member political interest group -0.169 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.55]* 
Very active member of church -0.117 
(0=no, 1=yes) [3.14]** 
Member community service group -0.128 
(0=no, 1=yes) [3.02]** 
V. active member com. service group -0.093 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.80] 
Active member hobbies group or club 0.1 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.96]* 
V. Active member hobbies group or club -0.101 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.73] 
Age -0.035 
(years) [6.26]** 
age2 0 
(years squared) [4.80]** 
gender of respondent -0.183 
(0=female, 1=male) [6.23]** 
Live in country town <20K 0.079 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.99]* 
Live in large town 25K - 100K 0.095 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.74]** 
Some tertiary education -0.145 
(0=no, 1=yes; less than secondary omitted) [4.38]** 
University educated -0.369 
(0=no, 1=yes; less than secondary omitted) [8.45]** 
Currently student -0.13 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.01]* 
Supervisory position at work -0.062 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.17]* 
managerial -0.169 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) [2.70]** 
professional -0.068 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) [1.21] 
Appendix Table 3: Predicting ignorance (continued) 
Dependent variable: Ignorance measure (higher = more ignorant) 
Tech -0.255 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) [4.16]** 
Clerical -0.262 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) [4.16]** 
Service -0.164 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) [2.76]** 
Trade -0.147 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) [2.49]* 
Factory -0.123 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) [1.56] 
Farming -0.377 
(0=no, 1=yes, manual labour omitted) [4.66]** 
Parents expressed political preference -0.153 
(0=no, 1=yes) [5.12]** 
Home owner -0.085 
(0=no; 1=own home) [2.34]* 
European ethnicity -0.066 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.56] 
Maori ethnicity 0.374 
(0=no, 1=yes) [9.31]** 
Asian ethnicity 0.107 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.13] 
Receives NZ superannuation -0.119 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.38]* 
receives sickness benefit -0.096 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.89] 
receives domestic purposes benefit 0.149 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.17]* 
receives family assistance 0.092 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.74] 
No Household Income 0.173 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.77] 
Household income <$15,900 0.125 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.11]* 
Household income $87,600-$119,999 -0.084 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.87] 
Household income >$120,000 -0.177 
(0=no, 1=yes) [3.66]** 
Don’t know household income 0.214 
(0=no, 1=yes) [4.96]** 
Divorced 0.059 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.24] 
Widowed 0.123 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.92] 
partner retired -0.084 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.62] 
Partner disabled 0.095 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.01] 
partner student 0.199 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.68] 
Partner in unpaid work outside home -0.122 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.03] 
Appendix Table 3: Predicting ignorance (continued) 
Dependent variable: Ignorance measure (higher = more ignorant) 
Left wing -0.302 
(0=no, 1=yes) [8.67]** 
Don’t know own ideology 0.588 
(0=no, 1=yes) [15.21]** 
Household financial situation better than last year -0.062 
(0=no, 1=yes)) [1.88] 
Country’s financial situation better than last year -0.044 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.32] 
Don’t know country’s financial outlook 0.078 
(0=no, 1=yes) [1.91] 
Country’s financial outlook better for next year 0.132 
(0=no, 1=yes) [3.39]** 
Don’t know prev. govt performance 0.177 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.50]* 
Previous government performance good 0.09 
(0=no, 1=yes) [2.89]** 
Constant 1.668 
 [9.14]** 
OLS, result of General to Specific reduction.  Standard errors not corrected for general to specific 
reduction; coefficients significant at the 10% level in the first specification are bolded.  N=3219, Adjusted 
R-squared: 0.47.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Appendix Table 4: Principal Component analysis of economic preferences. 
Factor   Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 2.33494 1.12637 0.2919 0.2919 
Factor 2 1.20857 0.24721 0.1511 0.4429 
Factor 3 0.96136 0.10368 0.1202 0.5631 
Factor 4 0.85768 0.03686 0.1072 0.6703 
Factor 5 0.82082 0.04975 0.1026 0.7729 
Factor 6 0.77108 0.07073 0.0964 0.8693 
Factor 7 0.70035 0.35515 0.0875 0.9569 
Factor 8 0.3452 . 0.0431 1 
P>chi2 = 0.0000, N=3743; 2 retained factors. 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
Female pay 0.3360 0.4206 0.7102 
Taxes and labour supp -0.1005 0.6498 0.5677 
Wage controls 0.7510 0.2692 0.3635 
Price controls 0.8299 0.1139 0.2983 
Import controls 0.6341 -0.0720 0.5927 
Immigration good 0.3766 -0.4458 0.6595 
Minimum wage -0.3887 0.5550 0.5409 
Government jobs 0.5140 0.1100 0.7237 
 
